Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe by Howard, Audrie
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 1 
2015 
Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and 
Zimbabwe 
Audrie Howard 
Washington University in St. Louis, School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the 
International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Audrie Howard, Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 137 (2016), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
BLOOD DIAMONDS: THE SUCCESSES AND 
FAILURES OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 
CERTIFICATION SCHEME IN ANGOLA,  
SIERRA LEONE AND ZIMBABWE 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2006 Leonardo DiCaprio thriller Blood Diamond
1
 brought the 
issue of conflict diamonds
2
 to the awareness of the general public. 
However, conflict diamonds began wreaking their havoc on parts of the 
developing world long before appearing in theatres. Over the past several 
decades, diamond trade has fueled conflicts in many countries across the 
world.
3
 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, implemented in 
2003,
4
 sought to “eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds in the chain 
of producing, exporting and importing rough diamonds” within 
participating countries.
5
  
 
 
 1. BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Bros. 2006). See BLOOD DIAMOND PLOT SYNOPSIS, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0450259/synopsis?ref_=tt_stry_pl (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). Set in 1999 
in Sierra Leone, Blood Diamond portrays the violent struggles of the country’s civil war and the 
diamond trade that fueled the conflict. The film concludes with a conference, representative of the 
actual meeting held in Kimberley, South Africa, which gave rise to the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. See also Jan Erik Wetzel, Targeted Economic Measure to Curb Armed Conflict? 
The Kimberley Process on the Trade in ‘Conflict Diamonds’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED 
CONFLICT: CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 161 (Noelle Quénivet and Shilan Shah-Davis eds., 
2010). Blood Diamond “specifically introduced the KP to a larger audience and, combined with 
campaigns by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Partnership Africa 
Canada (PAC), Global Witness, and Amnesty International, aimed at enlisting the general public in a 
new approach to curb armed conflicts by economic means.” Id. 
 2. DiamondFacts.org defines “conflict diamonds” as follows: “Conflict diamonds are diamonds 
illegally traded to fund conflict in war-torn areas, particularly in central and western Africa.” See also 
Conflict Diamonds, DIAMONDFACTS.ORG, http://www.diamondfacts.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article& id=128&Itemid=134&lang=en (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).  
 3. See Conflict Diamond Issues, BRILLIANT EARTH, http://www.brilliantearth.com/conflict-
diamond-trade (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). Brilliant Earth, a jewelry retailer committed to cultivating 
an ethical diamond industry so as to effect change in the diamond trade in developing countries, 
identifies the following African countries: Liberia, the Republic of Congo, the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. 
See also GLOBAL WITNESS: VENEZUELA http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-
diamonds/venezuela (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). Venezuela has also experienced conflict fueled by 
rough diamond trade. See also Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: 
Holding DeBeers Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1402, 1404–05 
(2001). “Observers note that in several African nations insurgent groups use diamonds to fund civil 
wars. The revenue that insurgents obtain from smuggling diamonds across borders allows them to buy 
more arms and to continue fighting.” 
 4. KIMBERLEY PROCESS: ABOUT, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about (last visited Nov. 
5, 2014). 
 5. Kimberley Process Core Document preamble, 2003, available at http://www.kimberley 
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Some have considered the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(also referred to as the KPCS) a success while others view it as a strong 
attempt at resolution that has ultimately failed.
6
 There are also many 
proposals for changes and additions to the existing structure that aim to 
make the KPCS more effective.
7
  
This note will focus on the history of the blood diamond trade in three 
African countries: Angola, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe.
8
 Part I of this 
note will delve into the history of blood diamonds in these three countries, 
including the conflicts, namely civil wars, which have been fueled by 
diamonds, and may still be fueled by diamonds today. Part II will detail 
the history of the KPCS—its structure regarding membership and policy, 
how it works, and how it is enforced. Part III will focus on the 
implementation of the KPCS in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe and 
the extent to which this implementation has been effective, while also 
identifying the current status of blood diamonds in each of the three 
countries. Finally, Part IV will examine some areas where the KPCS is 
 
 
process.comen/kpcs-core-document. See also GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMOND: TRACING THE 
DEADLY PATH OF THE WORLD’S MOST PRECIOUS STONES 130 (Basic Books 2012) (2002). “And of 
course, there’s the Kimberley Process, which was organized by the South African government and 
held its first meeting in Kimberley in May 2000. The issue the group tackled was frustratingly 
complicated: How to ensure that diamonds sold around the world by legitimate houses, retail stores, 
and producers are not from African rebel groups. Coming up with a solution would prove nearly 
impossible.” Id. 
 6. For example, Global Witness, one of the first organizations to commit itself to researching 
and drawing attention to the issue of conflict diamonds, ended its partnership with the Kimberley 
Process on December 5th of 2011. The following statement made by Chairman Gooch, a Founding 
Director of Global Witness, was given as a reason for the departure: “The scheme has failed three 
tests: it failed to deal with the trade in conflict diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire, was unwilling to take 
serious action in the face of blatant breaches of the rules over a number of years by Venezuela and has 
proved unwilling to stop diamonds fuelling corruption and violence in Zimbabwe. It has become an 
accomplice to diamond laundering—whereby dirty diamonds are mixed in with clean gems.” Gooch 
referred to the Kimberly Process’s refusal to address the Zimbabwean realities in the Marange fields as 
an outrage. Press Release, Charmian Gooch, Global Witness Leaves Kimberly Process, Calls for 
Diamond Trade to be Held Accountable (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-
witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable (last visited Jan. 14, 
2015). A discussion of Zimbabwe’s Marange diamond fields can be found in Section III, Subsection C 
of this note. Despite its departure from the Kimberley Process, Global Witness remains involved in 
investigating the trafficking of conflict diamonds. Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
 7. Several such proposals are discussed and evaluated in detail Section IV of this note. Briefly, 
some examples of proposed changes include encouragement from the United Nations to participate, 
the creation of a uniform policing scheme including a uniform set of punishments for policy violations, 
and the creation of a security force associated with this overarching policy so as to avoid corruption in 
member countries. 
 8. These countries were selected because they demonstrate the varying levels of success with 
which the KCPS has or has not eradicated blood diamond trafficking, and have faced somewhat 
unique circumstances and struggles throughout the implementation of the KPCS. 
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lacking as well as some proposed revisions to make the KPCS more 
effective. Lastly, this Note will conclude with an evaluation of Lastly, this 
note will evaluate how the KPCS should realistically and practically be 
updated to accommodate for changes in the realm of the diamond trade. 
I. HISTORY OF BLOOD DIAMONDS: ANGOLA, SIERRA LEONE AND 
ZIMBABWE 
The KPCS Core Document defines conflict diamonds as “rough 
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict 
aimed at undermining legitimate governments.”9 The document also refers 
to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56,
10
 which 
describes conflict diamonds as “rough diamonds which are used by rebel 
movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to 
undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments.”11 Conflict diamonds 
are often referred to as “blood diamonds” because of the lives lost in 
violent armed conflicts funded by the sale and trade of these diamonds.
12
 
The populations of Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe have shed much 
blood during conflicts funded by diamonds. A deeply detailed account of 
these conflicts is beyond the scope of this article, however some 
understanding of the nature of each conflict is important as a backdrop for 
the discussion of the role of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
in each of these countries.  
 
 
 9. KIMBERLEY PROCESS: ABOUT, supra note 4. 
 10. G.A. Res. 55/56, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Dec. 1, 2000). http://www.un.org/en/ga/ 
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/56&Lang=E. This resolution is titled: “The role of diamonds 
in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed 
conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts.”  
 11. Id. See also Paul Armstrong, How Diamonds Fuel Africa’s Conflicts, CNN, updated May 16, 
2012, available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/26/world/africa/blood-diamonds/. “They are generally 
in ‘rough’ form, meaning they have recently been extracted and not yet cut.” Although these diamonds 
are rough, they are still valuable and come at a high price. 
 12. Blood Diamonds, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1793249/blood-
diamond (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). This definition was “formulated during the 1990s, when brutal 
civil wars were being waged in parts of western and central Africa by rebel groups based in diamond-
rich areas of their countries . . . Rough diamonds mined in rebel-controlled areas were sold directly to 
merchants or were smuggled into neighboring countries, where they were merged into stocks of 
legitimately mined diamonds and then sold on the open market. Proceeds from diamond sales were 
used to buy arms and war matériel for the rebel groups, some of which conducted extremely violent 
campaigns that brought great suffering to civilians.” 
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A. Angola 
Civil war began in Angola right after the country became free from 
Portugal in 1975.
13
 The Angolan Civil War was a power struggle between 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or the MPLA, and the 
National Union for Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA.
14
 The first 
segment of civil war ended with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 
1994 by the Angolan government and UNITA.
15
 “A cease-fire went into 
effect two days later, and United Nations peace-keeping troops entered 
Angola in 1995.”16  
“At the time the Lusaka Protocol was signed, UNITA controlled over 
70% of Angola and nearly all of its diamond production.”17 Neither 
Angola’s government nor the diamond industry made any effort to halt the 
trade of diamonds mined by UNITA.
18
 Between the years of 1992 and 
1998, UNITA’s profits from the diamond trade totaled up to $13 billion19 
This money went to fund various UNITA ventures, including the purchase 
of arms.
20
 
The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was formed in 
1997 in order to help unify UNITA and MPLA structures, despite the 
requirement by the Lusaka Protocol that state authority be reestablished in 
 
 
 13. Conflict Diamonds, supra note 2. Angola was established as a Portuguese colony in 1575. It 
later became a province of Portugal, then gained its independence after what is known as the “Armed 
Struggle,” during which the Portuguese colonial power refused to heed the nationalist groups’ 
demands for their rights. THE EMBASSY OF ANGOLA, History, http://www.angola.org/index. 
php?page=history (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 14. THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR: THE CONCEPT OF “BLOOD DIAMONDS” EXPLAINED, 
http://www.ugs-angola.com/the-angolan-civil-war-the-concept-of-blood-diamonds-explained.php (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 15. LUSAKA PROTOCOL, Oct. 20, 1994, http://www.cfr.org/angola/lusaka-protocol/p23748. The 
Lusaka Protocol is an agreement containing 10 Annexes for the specific peace-related matters 
addressed in the document. Some of these include Legal Instruments, Military Issues, Political Issues, 
and National Reconciliation. UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKER, Lusaka Protocol Summary, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/node/145 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Patrick Alley and Alex Yearsley, Angola: Diamonds are a War’s Best Friend, Vol. 15 No. 1 
South African Report, p. 10 (Dec. 1999) (http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3718). 
 18. Id. Angola’s diamonds are of a high quality, usually falling within the top three categories on 
the nine-color scale used to assign value to diamonds. See also Wetzel, supra note 1 at 164. “The 
peace agreements of 1992 and 1994 had failed to end the conflict that had started in 1975. One reason 
for this was that UNITA could compensate its losses in external subsidies after the end of the Cold 
War by trading in diamonds.” 
 19. Alley, supra note 17. 
 20. Id. See also Saunders, supra note 3, at 1420–21. “UNITA used the revenue generated from 
the sale of diamonds extracted from their occupied territory to fund the war effort. Commentators 
speculate that UNITA made several billion dollars in revenue in the 1990s in diamond trade alone.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/8
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Angola.
21
 UNITA diamond sales continued until June 12, 1998, when the 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1173,
22
 which held 
that “all States shall take the necessary measures . . . to prohibit the direct 
or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are 
not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the GURN.”23 
The United Nations used this strategy of “choking the financial lifeline of 
UNITA” in an attempt to force it out of power.24 The strategy was not 
entirely effective, as UNITA still managed to fund its activities with 
smuggled diamonds.
25
  
B. Sierra Leone 
Civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 until 2002.
26
 The rebel 
group called Revolutionary United Front, or the RUF, lead by Foday 
Sankoh, gained possession of Sierra Leone’s diamond mines.27 The RUF’s 
wartime practices were truly appalling.
28
 Children were stolen from their 
 
 
 21. Augusta Chonchila, United Nations Fails in Angola, http://mondediplo.com/1999/07/ 
11angola (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). “Even more striking was the regime’s agreement in April 1997 to 
form a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (Gurn) including members of Unita before 
the rebel movement had given up an inch of the vast territory it had conquered at the cost of so much 
bloodshed, and despite the fact that the Lusaka Protocol had required the prior reestablishment of state 
authority throughout the country.” 
 22. S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12, 1998). http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
resolutions/Sc98/1173SC98.html. 
 23. Id. ¶ 12. The Certificate of Origin system is “far from perfect as GURN paperwork is 
confused by the use of different stamps, and the CO system does not apply to non Angolan diamonds. 
Thus, as long as a smuggler can slip diamond parcels into a neighboring country and pay for a false 
CO, which are certainly available in Zambia and probably elsewhere, the UN sanctions can no longer 
be applied.” Alley, supra note 17.  
 24. Eli G. Burton, Reverse the Curse: Creating a Framework to Mitigate the Resource Curse and 
Promote Human Rights in Mineral Extraction Industries in Africa, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 425, 430 
(2014). 
 25. Id. See also Saunders, supra note 3. Trade of conflict diamonds is “essential to maintaining 
the insurgent war effort” in Angola. In other words, were it not for the money generated by trade of 
conflict diamonds, UNITA may not have had the funding to purchase arms. 
 26. Sierra Leone, DIAMOND FACTS, http://www.diamondfacts.org/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=129&Itemid=167&lang=en#sierra (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). See also 
Saunders, supra note 3. Sierra Leone was colonized by Britain in 1808 as a location for freed slaves to 
live. Sierra Leone gained its independence from Britain in 1961. Id. 
 27. Sierra Leone, supra note 26. See also Saunders, supra note 3. “During the 1990s, RUF forces 
controlled the major diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Commentators discuss that some RUF fighters 
were illicit diamond miners and traders before becoming combatants.” See also Wetzel, supra note 1 at 
165. “Sankoh allegedly embezzled up to $90 million USD by personally concluding concession 
contacts with foreign diamond companies; during the war, the RUF could gain profits between $25–
125 million USD annually, which it used to supply its armed forces and to finance military 
operations.” 
 28. As discussed above, the film Blood Diamond portrays the atrocities that occurred in Sierra 
Leone (See supra note 1). The musical artist Kanye West also brought the issue of blood diamonds 
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families, drugged, force-fed gun powder to make them violent, and were 
then recruited as soldiers for the RUF’s rebel forces.29 Children were also 
forced to work in diamond mines under hazardous, even deadly, 
conditions.
30
 The ultimate affect of the civil war was to displace tens of 
thousands, force half a million to flee Sierra Leone, and leave unknown 
numbers dead or injured.
31
  
In 1999, the United Nations Security Council established the Mission 
in Sierra Leone to help with peace efforts.
32
 The United Nations officially 
accused neighboring Liberia’s leader, Charles Taylor, in 2002 of backing 
the RUF insurgency by providing weapons and training in exchange for 
diamonds.
33
 The civil war in Sierra Leone was ignited in large part by 
Taylor’s involvement.34 Due to his involvement, Taylor was sentenced to 
50 years in prison on 11 counts of aiding and abetting the rebels.
35
 Also in 
 
 
into the public’s awareness with his 2005 song “Diamonds in Sierra Leone.” KANYE WEST, 
DIAMONDS IN SIERRA LEONE (ROC-A-FELLA 2005). The music video for the original song depicts 
children working in mines as soldiers stand watch. At the end of the video, the phrase “Please purchase 
conflict free diamonds” appears on the screen. Vevo, Diamonds in Sierra Leone, YOUTUBE (2005). In 
a remix collaboration with fellow artist Jay Z, West tailored new verses to match the content of the 
original music video. The remix includes the following lyrics: “See, a part of me sayin’ keep shinin’. 
How? When I know of the blood diamonds. Though it’s thousands of miles away, Sierra Leone 
connects to what we go through today.” KANYE WEST AND JAY-Z, DIAMONDS IN SIERRA LEONE 
(REMIX) (ROC-A-FELLA 2005).  
 29. Return to Freetown (CNN Television broadcast Dec. 23, 2001). Transcript available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/23/cp.00.html. “Then they took me away from my 
mother. My mother was alone. So they took me then with my elder brother and trained us. They gave 
us gunpowder and we ate it. They put some other medicine in it and that gave us the mind to be able to 
kill.” In order to give them the “mind to kill,” children were also told to rub blood in their eyes. Id.  
 30. Burton, supra note 24. 
 31. Id. “The war lasted until 2002, claiming over 50,000 lives and involving an incalculable 
number of inhumane acts.” 
 32. UNAMSIL, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, http://www.un.org/en/peace 
keeping/missions/past/unamsil (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). See also Wetzel, supra note 1 at 165. One 
United Nations effort was the Security Council Resolution 1306, passed in 2000, which “prohibited 
the import of uncertified rough diamonds from rebel-held territory in Sierra Leone.” 
 33. Burton, supra note 24. Taylor was leading his own rebel movement, the “National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia, through which he armed the RUF in exchange for the diamonds mined in Sierra 
Leone. See also Wetzel, supra note 1 at 165. “The RUF had received support from Liberia all along, 
and after the election of Charles Taylor as president in 1997, Liberia had become an open route, with 
Taylor receiving up to 60 percent of the smuggled diamonds in return.” 
 34. Id. 
 35. Ben Brumfield, Charles Taylor Sentenced to 50 Years for War Crimes, CNN, updated May 
31, 2012, available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/30/world/africa/netherlands-taylor-sentencing. 
Taylor expressed no remorse at the trial, considering himself a peacemaker and accusing the United 
States of throwing the trial and paying witnesses to testify against him. He feels he is “a leader 
wronged by corruption and a hypocritical hand of justice with a political agenda.” Id. The court, 
however, “saw his position of power as president of the neighboring country and the use of his own 
military’s capabilities to stoke up RUF rebels as making him directly responsible for the bloodshed he 
encouraged.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/8
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2002, the United Nations placed a ban on all direct and indirect diamond 
imports from Sierra Leone.
36
 The civil war came to an end in 2002, and 
conflict has yet to break out again in Sierra Leone.
37
 Observers have even 
seen diamonds contribute to the rebuilding of the country’s 
infrastructure.
38
 
C. Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe gained its independence from Britain in 1980.
39
 Since that 
time, Zimbabwe has seen only one president, Robert Mugabe. Mugabe’s 
original party, the Zimbabwean African National Union, or ZANU, 
merged with the opposing Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union, or ZAPU, 
to form ZANU-PF.
40
 When challenged by the Movement for Democratic 
Change, or MDC, lead by Tsvangirai in 1999 the ZANU-PF responded 
with intimidation and rigged elections in order to maintain political 
control.
41
 Tsvangirai won many votes in the early rounds of the 2008 
presidential election, but withdrew after a violent ZANU-PF response.
42
 
Despite the plainly tenuous relationship, international pressures led 
 
 
 36. Sierra Leone, supra note 26. This was done “in an effort to help stabilize the country and 
reduce the rebel's access to foreign currency and arms.” Id. 
 37. Brumfleld, supra note 35. Peace was achieved and maintained with the help of a United 
Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone, known as “UNAMSIL.” See UNAMSIL: A SUCCESS 
STORY IN PEACEKEEPING, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/ 
Overview.pdf. “Over the course of its mandate, the UN disarmed tens of thousands of ex-fighters, 
assisted in holding national elections, helped to rebuild the country’s police force, and contributed 
towards rehabilitating the infrastructure and bringing government services to local communities. The 
UN also helped the Government stop illicit trading in diamonds and regulate the industry. During the 
war, rebels had used money from “blood” or “conflict” diamonds to buy weapons which had fuelled 
the conflict.” Id. UNAMSIL oversaw free presidential and parliamentary elections, facilitated elections 
for local officials, helped set up the Special Court for Sierra Leone where those responsible for war 
crimes can be tried and brought to justice, and reconstructed schools, police stations and medical 
clinics. Id. 
 38. Conflict Diamonds, supra note 2. While this may seem like a small step toward overall 
progress when juxtaposed against the atrocities still occurring in Zimbabwe’s Marange diamond fields, 
as discussed below, it is important to see that revenue from diamond exports can be used for positive 
change. Perhaps, in this way, Sierra Leone has begun to reverse its resource curse. 
 39. ZIMBABWE PROFILE, BBC News Africa, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113618 
(last updated July 29, 2014). 
 40. Julie Elizabeth Nichols, A Conflict of Diamonds: The Kimberly Process and Zimbabwe’s 
Marange Diamond Fields, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 648, 664 (2012). “Following a horrific 
period of massacres between 1982 and 1985, ZANU and its main political opposition, the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (“ZAPU”), reached an agreement, which merged the two parties, creating 
ZANU-PF and maintaining Mugabe’s presidency.” 
 41. Id. “The ZANU-PF government responded by further suppressing civil liberties and 
intimidating its way through multiple fraudulent elections.”  
 42. Id. at 665. “ZANU-PF’s response was so violent, immediate, and widespread that Tsvangirai 
withdrew.” 
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Mugabe and Tsvangirai to establish a regime where Mugabe remained 
president and Tsvangirai became prime minister.
43
 It is easy to understand 
why this arrangement, while legitimate, is so hotly contested.
44
 This is 
significant because it means that the legitimate government, rather than 
rebel or opposition groups, controls all diamond mines in Zimbabwe.
45
 
D. A “Resource Curse”? 
Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, like most of the African 
continent, have all suffered from what some scholars call a “resource 
curse.”46 This occurs when countries with at least one very plentiful 
natural resource, here diamonds, are unable to utilize that resource to rise 
out of poverty.
47
 Resource curses tend to lead to poor economic growth, 
authoritarian-style government regimes, corruption due to rent-seeking 
behavior, and conflict.
48
 The structure overall seems to be what has 
prevented wealth from reaching an affected country’s population at large, 
and results ultimately in poverty and significant inequalities.
49
  
 
 
 43. Id. “However, international pressure eventually convinced the leaders to establish a 
transitional power-sharing agreement, in which Mugabe retained the presidency and Tsvangirai 
became prime minister. Since September 15, 2008, this hotly contested and extremely controversial 
coalition has been Zimbabwe’s legitimate government.” 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. Unlike the use of conflict diamonds to fund rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone, 
the diamonds mined in Zimbabwe are being used to fund only the activities of the legitimate 
government. The Kimberly Process’s failure to address this at-home corruption is one of the principle 
reasons that Global Witness has decided to end its relationship with the Kimberley Process. Global 
Witness stated in its press release: “Newspapers have reported that the Zimbabwean Central 
Intelligence Organisation, the state security service aligned with Mugabe whose members are accused 
of committing acts of violence against opposition supporters, directly benefits from off-budget 
diamond revenues.” GLOBAL WITNESS LEAVES KIMBERLY PROCESS, CALLS FOR DIAMOND TRADE TO 
BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 6. 
 46. Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the Blood 
Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1718 (2010). A resource curse arises “when an open 
market and an abundance of natural resources combine to create or exacerbate a governance problem.” 
Wexler points out as particularly “vexing” the resource curse which occurs “when a valuable natural 
resource contributes to the instigation and lengthening of internal conflicts.” Id. The continued trade of 
conflict diamonds to fund election intimidation strategies seems to meet this second category of 
resource curse.  
 47. Id. at 1723. 
 48. Id. 
 49.  Id. “This rent-seeking behavior leads to low redistribution of rates, which fosters low 
standard of living, poverty, and systemic inequalities.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/8
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II. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS—HISTORY, KEY PLAYERS, HOW IT WORKS 
AND HOW IT IS ENFORCED 
The Kimberley Process first took shape in May of 2000 when 
representatives from several African countries met in Kimberley, South 
Africa to “discuss ways to stop the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’ and ensure 
that diamond purchases were not financing violence by rebel movements 
and their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments.”50 The 
United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution for the creation of 
an international scheme for the certification of rough diamonds in January 
of 2001, by which they “welcom[e] with appreciation by the African 
diamond-producing countries to launch an inclusive consultation process 
of Governments, industry and civil society” and also “[u]rge[] all States to 
support efforts of the diamond producing, processing, exporting and 
importing countries and the diamond industry to find ways to break the 
link between conflict diamonds and armed conflict.”51 The KPCS was 
implemented in 2002 via the Interlaken Declaration and participants began 
following the KPCS in 2003.
52
 
As of 2014, there are 54 “Participants” in the KPCS, representing 81 
countries, since the European Union and its Member States collectively 
count as one participant.
53
 Roughly 99.8% of the world’s rough diamond 
exports come from Kimberley Process members.
54
 “Applicants” are 
candidates for membership that have committed to joining the KPCS, but 
do not yet meet the membership requirements to become official 
 
 
 50. KP BASICS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). See also 
Wetzel, supra note 1 at 170. “The KP aims at cutting off funds to rebel movements by curbing trade in 
conflict diamonds, while protecting and promoting legitimate trade. Its principal tool for this dual 
purpose is the establishment of a certification scheme for rough diamonds.” 
 51. G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 10. 
 52. KP BASICS, supra note 50. See also Campbell, supra note 5 at 116. “The procedure was 
dubbed the Kimberley Process, after the famous De Beers mine in South Africa, and was designed to 
hammer out a united front, a game plan for cutting off the flow from the rebel groups that, even if most 
of them know it was practically impossible, would at least give the impression of a positive, pro-active 
response to the mounting criticism of the industry.” 
 53. KP BASICS, supra note 50. See also KP PARTICIPANTS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
en/participants (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). A full listing of all 54 participants is available. See also 
Tina Muscarella Gooch, Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should the Difference Matter to the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 189, 194–95 (2008). The KPCS 
members meet once a year at a Plenary meeting. While these meetings are closed to the public, an 
annual Communique is published after the Plenary meeting ends. 
 54.  PARTICIPANTS, supra note 53.  
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members.
55
 Membership in the Kimberley Process is not limited to state 
actors.
56
 There are also groups labeled “observers” who provide assistance 
and expertise in monitoring the effectiveness of the KPCS.
57
 Each year, a 
new Chair and Vice Chair are selected. In 2014, China serves as Chair and 
Angola as Vice Chair.
58
 
Joining the Kimberly Process scheme is voluntary, however countries 
that choose to join must meet and maintain certain minimum 
requirements.
59
 The KPCS works by requiring three things of participating 
nations. First, countries must enact legislation putting in place a 
requirement that any diamonds shipped into or out of that country be 
certified under the KPCS, including trade prohibitions that ban rough 
diamond trade with any country not participating in the KPCS.
60
 Second, 
the participating nation must make an official commitment to uphold the 
goals of the KPCS.
61
 Finally, the participant must agree to meet annually 
with other participants to monitor the progress of the KPCS.
62
 
Significantly, an enforcement mechanism is not required, leaving 
enforcement to the discretion of each participating nation.
63
 The KPCS 
leaves participating nations independent to enact whatever legislation they 
deem necessary for enforcement of the scheme.
64
 The Core Document 
makes a series of “recommendations,” but the voluntary nature of the 
 
 
 55. CANDIDATES, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/candidates (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
Current candidates for the KPCS are: Burkina Faso, Republic of Chile, Republic of Kenya, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, and the Republic of Zambia. 
 56. OBSERVERS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/observers (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 57. Id. The observers are the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA), the Civil Society 
Coalition, the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI), and the World Diamond Council (WDC). 
Observers attend the annual Plenary meeting with all KPCS participants. 
 58. CHAIR, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/chair (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). The Vice 
Chair is selected by participants each year at the Plenary meeting. The Vice Chair then becomes the 
Chair having completing its year-term as Vice Chair. The Chair and Vice Chair oversee the 
implementation of the KPCS generally, as well as the activities of committees within the KPCS. 
 59. Burton, supra note 24. 
      60.  Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. 
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 217, 225–26 (2005). 
 61. Id. at 226. 
 62. Id. The overarching goal of these measures is “to make it more difficult for warlords, rebel 
militias, and rogue regimes to flood the international market with diamonds, meaning that diamonds 
will no longer serve as a means of funding revolts.” Id. at 225. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kimberley Process Core Document § 2, 2003, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess. 
com/en/kpcs-core-document. Specifically, section 4 of the document states: that each participant 
should “as required, amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the 
Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive proportional penalties for transgressions.” 
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entire scheme is emphasized throughout.
65
 As will be discussed in Part IV, 
the lack of overarching uniform legislation and enforcement mechanisms 
has faced criticism. 
Under the KPCS, any shipment of diamonds must be accompanied by a 
Kimberley Process Certificate.
66
 The Kimberley Process Certificate can be 
in any language so long as an English translation is also incorporated, 
must be resistant to tamper and forgery, and must bear the title “Kimberly 
Process Certificate,” and this statement: “The rough diamonds in this 
shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds.”67 Minimum 
additional pieces of information required are country of origin, numbering 
with Alpha-2 country code, dates of issuance and expiry, issuing authority, 
identification of both the importer and the exporter, carat weight, value of 
the shipment in U.S. dollars, the number of parcels in the shipment, and a 
validation of the Certificate by the exporting authority.
68
 
What about diamonds purchased by consumers before the 
implementation of the KCPS? The drafters of the KCPS recommended 
that if these diamond owners are seeking to sell their diamonds, they 
should stipulate to the best of their ability the origin of the diamonds.
69
 
Data regarding member states’ diamond trade and production can be found 
 
 
 65. Id. at annex 2. Recommendations give examples of what participants are encouraged to do. 
For example, “Participants that produce diamonds and that have rebel groups suspected of mining 
diamonds within their territories are encouraged to identify the areas of rebel diamond mining activity 
and provide this information to all other participants.” Id. at annex 2. The language throughout the rest 
of the core document describes what participating countries “should” do, rather than what they must 
do or what they are required to do. Further, the document prescribes for self-regulation, stating that 
“participants understand that a voluntary system of industry self-regulation, as referred to in the 
Preamble of this Document, will provide for a system of warranties underpinned through verification 
by independent auditors of individual companies and supported by internal penalties set by industry, 
which will help to facilitate the full traceability of rough diamond transactions by government 
authorities.” Id. § 4.  
 66. Kimberley Process Core Document sec. 2, 2003, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess. 
com/en/kpcs-core-document. 
 67. Kimberley Process Core Document Annex 1 (2003), http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/ 
kpcs-core-document. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Fishman, supra note 61, at 228. “. . . the KPCS drafters recognized that billions of dollars 
worth of rough and polished diamonds presently exist in industry inventories, as well as in the hands 
of past consumers. Both of these diamond supplies may easily re-enter the marketplace over time. 
Instead of confiscating all diamonds mined and sold pre-January 1, 2003, the drafters recommended 
that all owners of such diamonds in the market to sell these diamonds stipulate to the best of their 
ability that the diamonds are not blood diamonds and indicate the place of origin, preferably with a 
statement from the seller attesting to this fact.” Id. 
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on the KPCS website.
70
 This information was not made public until 2007 
when member states finally gave into pressure from NGOs.
71
 
The diamond industry itself responded to the increased attention being 
paid to conflict diamonds with the formation of the World Diamond 
Counsel.
72
 The World Diamond Counsel then established its “System of 
Warranties” which “extends the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process 
beyond the export and import of rough diamonds.”73 This is a voluntary 
system of self-regulation that requires that members include a statement of 
compliance on all invoices for the purchase or sale of rough diamonds, 
polished diamonds, and pieces of jewelry containing diamonds.
74
 
III. ANGOLA, SIERRA LEONE AND ZIMBABWE NOW: DID THE KPCS 
WORK? 
It has now been over a decade since the KPCS was implemented. 
Angola adopted the KPCS in 2003,
75
 as did Sierra Leone
76
 and 
 
 
 70. The KPCS website provides annual reports dating back to the year a particular participant 
joined. See, e.g., ANGOLA, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/angola (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
Information on the “Annual Rough Diamond Summary” report includes the volume and value of total 
diamonds produced, imported and exported for a given year. There is also a calculation in US dollars 
of the value per carat of diamonds produced, imported and exported. Also denoted is the number of 
Kimberley Process Certificates that the country has issued that year. 
 71. Wexler, supra note 46, at 1766. “Over time and with NGO pressure, however, member states 
agreed to put trade and production data on the website six months after internal publication. In 2007, 
the website made this data available to the public.” Id. Making this data public should help ease 
concerns regarding transparency in the KPCS certification process and enforcement. 
 72. Andrew Winetroub, A Diamond Scheme is Forever Lost: The Kimberley Process’s 
Deteriorating Tripartite Structure and Its Consequences for the Scheme’s Survival, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEG. STUD. 1425, 1427 (2013). “As governments and civil society groups began to act, so too did the 
diamond industry by participating in the creation of the KP and by creating its own standards through 
the World Diamond Council (WDC).” 
 73. MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). The 
World Diamond Counsel also seeks to provide technical, financial and other support to the Kimberley 
Process, and generally serves as a representation for the diamond industry in KPCS Plenary meetings 
and other related forums. Id. 
 74. Id. The following is the text of the statement which must be present on invoices for sale and 
purchase of rough diamonds, polished diamonds, or jewelry containing diamonds: “The diamonds 
herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and in 
compliance with United Nations resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are 
conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these 
diamonds.” Failure to comply with this and other principles laid out in the System of Warranties could 
result in “expulsion from the various diamond industry institutions.” SYSTEM OF WARRANTIES, World 
Diamond Counsel, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/System%20 
of%20Warranties%20WDC%202014.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
 75. ANGOLA, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/angola (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 76. SIERRA LEONE, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/sierra-leone (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
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Zimbabwe.
77
 To what extent has the Kimberly Process Certification 
Scheme been successful in curbing trade of blood diamonds to fuel armed 
conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe? 
A. Angola 
An author reflecting upon Angola’s experience since the 
implementation of the KPCS described Angola as a “poster child for the 
global effort to keep ‘blood diamonds’ out of the world’s jewelry 
stores”—at least on paper.
78
 Yet, human rights violations continued to 
occur through recent years with incidents of unlicensed miners being 
beaten and bribed by security guards and soldiers.
79
 So while the 
Kimberley Process may have curbed the flow of blood diamonds from 
Angolan mines to outside sources, there is a significant loophole that 
permits the violence and bloodshed to perpetuate. Specifically, the 
loophole rests in the KPCS’s definition of a conflict diamond, since it does 
not account for human-rights abuses occurring in diamond mines 
controlled by Angola’s legitimate government.
80
  
Rafael Marques de Morais, an Angolan journalist and prominent 
human-rights activist, recognized in an address to the European Parliament 
Subcommittee on Human Rights’ hearing on ‘Indigenous People and the 
Extractive Industries’ that there is a stark contrast in Angola “between 
abject poverty and scandalous wealth.”
81
 Poor villagers dig in the mines 
because they have no other means to survive while government and 
military leaders fill their own pockets with diamonds by purchasing from 
the poor, illegal miners.
82
 De Morais explains the practical effect of the 
 
 
 77. ZIMBABWE, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/zimbabwe (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 78. Michael Allen, The ‘Blood Diamond’ Resurfaces, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2010) 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704198004575311282588959188. This author 
stated in more detail: “Angola is now a leading member of the so-called Kimberley Process, an 
industry-wide effort to prevent commerce in rough diamonds by insurgent groups. Today, Angola is 
the world’s fifth-largest diamond producer by value, and its gems are coveted for their size and 
purity.” 
 79. Id. “Here in the sprawling jungle of northeast Angola, a violent economy prevails in which 
thousands of peasant miners eke out a living searching for diamonds with shovels and sieves. Because 
they lack government permits, miners and their families say they are routinely beaten and shaken 
down for bribes by soldiers and private security guards—and, in extreme cases, killed.” 
 80. Id. “But critics say there’s a big loophole in that definition: It doesn’t take into account 
human-rights abuses in diamond territory controlled by governments themselves.” 
 81. Rafael Marques de Morais, Angolan Blood Diamonds: The Role of the European Union and 
the Kimberley Process (Apr. 24, 2013) (transcript available at http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201304250288.html). 
 82. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
150 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:137 
 
 
 
 
loophole in the KPCS definition of “conflict diamond” with the following 
powerful statement: “Diamonds being mined today in Lundas are no less 
bloody than those that funded past wars. Today, my people are being 
assassinated not to fund a civil war, but out of sheer greed and 
malignance.”
83
 
B. Sierra Leone 
A visit in 2011 to Koidu in Sierra Leone revealed a country still very 
much affected by the evils of the diamond trade.
84
 Despite the fact that the 
war had been over for almost a decade,
85
 a “frustration” one author 
described as a “deep-seated sense of injustice” still hung heavy in the air.
86
 
Yet, a BBC reporter urged boldly in 2012 that “there are no more ‘blood 
diamonds’ in Sierra Leone.”
87
 The city of Koidu, which was once a 
“moonscape of small pits” dug by people searching for even the tiniest 
gems, the city has started to become lively once more.
88
 An NPR reporter 
recognized Sierra Leone’s new roads and the advent of electricity to major 
cities, but qualified this progress by noting that the diamonds are still a 
major source of contention for Sierra Leone and will continue to be so 
until they can be used as a resource for development.
89
  
 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Campbell, supra note 5, at 231. “Anyone who doubts that the gap between diamonds 
marketing mythos as symbols of love and the realities of their origins was as wide as ever in 2011—
even without warfare to exacerbate the difference—need only spend a few days in Koidu, a run-down 
collection of cinderblock buildings, mosques, and market kiosks still teetering in the wake of the war, 
held together with bush sticks and clotheslines. Throughout the RUF war, Koidu got the worst of it and 
has yet to recover.” 
 85. Id. at 233. “From afar, it was tempting to get the impression that all was fine. No instances of 
large-scale violence had occurred since the 2002 election that marked the end of the war.” 
 86. Id. at 232–33. “Yet there was clearly a sense of frustration in the air around Koidu, a vague 
feeling of trouble brewing that took some time to identify as a deep-seated sense of injustice.” Id. at 
265. “Sierra Leone of 1991 must have been a lot like Sierra Leone of 2011. It has all of the 
ingredients: a weak central government riven with corruption, greed-blinded chiefs in the provinces 
selling out their own people for cash, resource industries run with no transparency or accountability, 
and a citizenry yet again disenfranchised and starting to feel its resentment rise.” Id. 
 87. Mark Doyle, Sierra Leone ‘Blood Diamonds’ Not Forever, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-africa-18109186 (last updated May 20, 2012). 
 88. Id. “Where there were rebels with guns, there are now police officers. Where there were 
hungry, displaced people, there are now lively market traders.” 
 89. Tamasin Ford, Sierra Leone’s Diamonds Still a Source of Contention, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 23, 2012, 6:40 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/11/23/165271466/sierra-leone-holds-a-vote-not-
a-war-on-diamonds. “There are new roads and electricity in the major cities. But the challenge of 
transforming the country’s natural resources into development for its people still remains.”  
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C. Zimbabwe 
In 2006, a group of villagers in the Marange district in Zimbabwe 
discovered what has been valued as the richest diamond deposit ever 
found.
90
 The diamond deposits are even more desirable because they are 
alluvial, rather than Kimberlite, meaning that they could be much more 
easily extracted than diamonds in other mines.
91
 The mines had been 
declared open for mining by Zimbabweans; however, after an influx of 
illegal miners entered the mines, ZANU-PF’s army took control of the 
mines in 2008, at which time over 200 miners were massacred.
92
 Serious 
human-rights violations such as dog attacks and beating by guards occur 
too regularly in the Maragne diamond fields.
93
 There have also been 
reports of mass rapes by soldiers overseeing work in the mines.
94
 In 2011, 
various mining camps were discovered in Zimbabwe’s Marange fields, 
where corrupt police and military would recruit illegal miners to dig 
diamonds for them.
95
 Similar beatings and dog-biting incidents were 
common in these camps.
96
 
 
 
 90. Zimbabwe and Blood Diamonds, BRILLIANT EARTH, http://www.brilliantearth.com/Blood-
Diamonds-Fact-Sheet-2010/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). It is projected that the Marange fields could 
produce as much as 40 million carats per year, which translates to $2 billion. 
 91. Wexler, supra note 46, at 1769–70. This also meant that individuals, not just private 
companies, had the ability to extract diamonds. “Unlike the previously existing Kimberlite diamond 
mines, which required private companies to extract stones, individuals could mine in these new 
alluvial diamond fields through less intensive methods.” Id. 
 92. Sebastien Berger, Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe Military ‘Profiting from Diamond Massacre,’ 
THE TELEGRAPH, June 26, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/gemd/ 
5644252/Zanu-PF-and-Zimbabwe-military-profiting-from-diamond-massacre.html. “In its report, 
Diamonds in the Rough, Human Rights Watch says that ‘at least 214’ people were killed at Chiadzwa, 
and that Zanu-PF used the mineral deposits to reward the military and keep them loyal as Zimbabwe 
spiralled into chaos.” 
 93. Zimbabwe: Rampant Abuses in Marange Diamond Fields, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Aug. 30, 
2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/zimbabwe-rampant-abuses-marange-diamond-fields. The 
Human Rights Watch has gathered evidence of incidences of violence against local unlicensed minors 
in Zimbabwe’s mines, despite reports made by Zimbabwe government officials denying the 
occurrence of such incidents. Id.  
 94. Burton, supra note 24, at 436. “Even after taking the mining fields from the police forces that 
oversaw them, under state control, there have been reports of underage child miners, severe beatings, 
and even wrongful death suits against the companies . . . . The most egregious allegation, however, is 
the report of mass rapes by soldiers at the mines.” 
 95. Hilary Andersson, Marange Diamond Field: Zimbabwe Torture Camp Discovered, BBC 
PANORAMA, Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14377215. Locals refer to the 
main mining camp as “Diamond Base,” and a witness described it as a “remote collection of military 
tents, with an outdoor razor wire enclosure where the prisoners are kept.”  
 96. Id. One victim commented that the beatings were so severe that miners were sometimes 
unable to walk properly. Another victim stated that miners would be administered 40 whips in the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
152 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:137 
 
 
 
 
To its credit, the KPCS has not been completely silent on the issue of 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe. When human rights offenses began 
in Zimbabwe’s Marange diamond fields as early at 2006, human rights 
groups associated with the KPCS attempted to document the incidences. 
However, Zimbabwe denied that the abuses ever occurred.
97
 Remaining 
suspicious, the 2008 plenary meeting of the KPCS recommended further 
monitoring of the diamond trade in Zimbabwe in light of continued reports 
of violence and diamond-smuggling in the Marange fields.
98
 In 2009, the 
KPCS issued a report documenting occurrences of violence and 
smuggling, and collected evidence of these injustices to support these 
claims when Zimbabwe permitted investigators a surprising amount of 
access to the Marange fields.
99
 Despite this transparency, the state of 
blood diamond trade in Zimbabwe remains tenuous. The KPCS placed a 
ban on diamond imports from and exports to Zimbabwe in 2009 due to its 
repeated violations in the Marange fields, but Zimbabwe was reinstated in 
2011.
100
 
IV. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS: A SUCCESS? 
While it is clear that the KPCS is not without its flaws, it is important 
to recognize that the system has succeeded in reducing the trade of conflict 
diamonds.
101
 Nor is the KPCS flawed beyond repair. Supporters and 
critics alike tend to agree that the Kimberly Process has been an important 
step in the right direction.
102
 In the 1990s, conflict diamond sales made up 
 
 
morning, 40 in the afternoon and another 40 in the evening. Another prisoner described a procedure by 
which mine police would handcuff miners, then unleash dogs to bite the miners. 
 97. Wexler, supra note 46, at 1771. “The Kimberley Process slowly addressed these human 
rights abuses and KPCS violations. Human rights groups associated with the Kimberley Process began 
documenting these abuses in as early as 2006, but Zimbabwe vociferously denied such occurrences.” 
 98. Id. at 1771–72. “In 2008, the Kimberley Process plenary meeting recommended ‘further 
monitoring of development and concerted actions’ and expressed ‘growing concerns at the reports of 
violence and indications of smuggling in the Marange Mining area.’ Thus, the working group on 
monitoring began investigating trade anomalies and member states were asked to provide technical 
assistance to Zimbabwe to stop the illicit flow of Marange diamonds.” 
 99. Id. at 1773. 
 100. Burton, supra note 24, at 435. “While the KPCS banned imports from, and exports to, 
Zimbabwe in 2009 due to reports relating to military control of the diamond mines, the KPCS 
reinstated Zimbabwe in late 2011 after reassessment.” 
 101.  Wetzel, supra note 1, at 161. “While not perfect, [the Kimberley Process] is a good example 
of how to address the economic basis of a conflict in order to influence the decision-making process of 
the relevant warring stakeholders.” 
 102. Id. at 178. “. . . [H]ence the KP can be seen as a positive step made by the international 
community and as an early model for how the international regulation of the trade in a special 
commodity can contribute to the curbing of an armed conflict.” 
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15% of the world’s diamond trade, and this number dropped to .4% by 
2009 because of the implementation of the KPCS.
103
 There has also been 
an expansion in the legal diamond market in certain African countries after 
the implementation of the KPCS.
104
 
One strong indicia of the KPCS’s failure is Global Witness’s 
withdrawal from the Kimberley Process.
105
 Global Witness is an 
organization that strives to effect change in areas of the world suffering 
from conflict, corruption or environmental destruction.
106
 In a press 
release announcing Global Witness’s departure from the KPCS, Founding 
Director Charmian Gooch pointed toward three specific ways
107
 in which 
the KPCS failed: (1) it failed to deal with conflict diamond trade in Cote 
d’Ivoire; (2) it took no serious action when Venezuela blatantly and 
repeatedly breached KPCS rules; and (3) the KPCS has failed to halt the 
human rights violations and violent atrocities occurring in Zimbabwe.
108
 
In Zimbabwe, Global Witness was specifically concerned with funds from 
Marange diamonds being used to intimidate voters in the 2013 presidential 
election.
109
 
 
 
 103. Burton, supra note 24, at 433. “By 2009, the KPCS succeeded in lowering the sales of 
conflict diamonds from their 1990s level of fifteen percent of the world’s diamond trade to merely 0.4 
percent. The legal diamond market has greatly expanded thanks to the KPCS.”  
 104. Id. at 433–34. For example, Sierra Leone generated essentially no revenue from legal 
diamond trade during its civil war years, but this grew to $125 million in 2006. See also Wetzel, supra 
note n. 1, at 177. “. . . [L]egitimate trade in rough diamonds has created revenue for former conflict-
ridden countries. In 2006, Sierra Leone exported US$125 million worth of diamonds legally . . . these 
revenues can now be invested in local infrastructure. Hence, the KP has helped turn ‘conflict 
diamonds’ into ‘reconstruction diamonds.’” 
 105. Winetroub, supra note 73, at 1428. “Despite the potential for an inclusive organization with 
broad participation, states and the industry are threatening the KP’s legitimacy by failing to adequately 
address diamonds that continue to fund violence and human rights abuses, as exhibited by the Marange 
diamond fields case in Zimbabwe that led to Global Witness’s departure from the KP.” The legitimacy 
of the entire scheme may be called into question if the KPCS cannot effectively address the human 
rights violations being funded by sale of Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds. 
 106. About Us, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://new.globalwitness.org/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 4, 
2015).  
 107. The first two of these discussed failures of the Kimberley Process Certification scheme, 
while relevant to the diamond certification scheme at large, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 108. Press Release, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade to be 
Held Accountable, GLOBAL WITNESS, Dec. 2, 2011, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-
witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable. The tone of the press 
release, Gooch’s commentary in particular, demonstrates an extreme level of frustration. See also 
Campbell, supra note 5, at 240–41. The case of Zimbabwe is “a stark illustration of how toothless the 
Kimberley Process has proved to be since it was adopted with much fanfare as the cure for blood 
diamonds. A KP participant, Zimbabwe had for years been ruthlessly using its state security units to 
force civilians to dig for diamonds at the Marange field near the border with Mozambique, a diamond 
area discovered in 2006.” 
 109. Press Release, supra note 109. “Over the last decade, elections in Zimbabwe have been 
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At the 2013 KPCS annual meeting, representatives expressed 
disappointment at the group’s failure to redefine “conflict diamonds” 
under the KPCS to include those diamonds currently falling through the 
cracks because they lead to civil rights abuses by state entities, rather than 
directly funding the purchase of weapons or other war supplies.
110
 The 
United States made a push for a redefinition during its term as Chair in 
2012.
111
 
Ernest Blom, of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, has argued 
that the KPCS was successful in achieving its goal of stopping the practice 
of mining diamonds to fund wars.
112
 Human rights violations like those 
occurring in Zimbabwe, he argues, fall outside of the scope of the 
diamond industry.
113
 This view, that the KPCS is a “robust system that 
works most of the time”
114
 is certainly not shared by the majority of 
interested parties. 
 
 
associated with the brutal intimidation of voters. Orchestrating this kind of violence costs a lot of 
money. As the country approaches another election there is a very high risk of Zanu PF hardliners 
employing these tactics once more and using Marange diamonds to foot the bill.” 
 110. Kimberley Process Fails to Redefine ‘Blood Diamonds’, DEUTCHE WELLE, http://www.dw. 
de/kimberley-process-meeting-fails-to-redefine-blood-diamonds/a-17246854 (last visited Nov. 6, 
2014). One party to the conference, Shamiso Mtisi, stated that a new definition was necessary “to 
capture the abuses that are ongoing in communities and these are abuses committed by state entities, 
by the police, the military and also private security guards.” Id. Such a definition would encompass the 
present situation in Zimbabwe. See also Winetroub, supra note 73. at 1432–33. “[T] . . . he definition’s 
minimizing scope sees the role of diamonds in fueling conflicts as excessively black-and-white. 
Conflict diamonds are not simply the product of a system in which illegitimate rebels operate against 
‘legitimate governments.”. As a result of this false premise, the KP makes no exceptions for groups 
whose principal purpose is to confront a repressive regime or to combat human rights abuses.” See 
also Wetzel, supra note 1, at 173. “On a general level, while the KP’s definition is wider and includes 
for example Charles Taylor’s involvement in Sierra Leone, it is still narrow in that only trading by 
rebel movements is prohibited. Diamonds certified by a government are seen as legitimate, even if it 
subsequently uses trade revenues to finance its own military activities. The KP thus also bars 
‘legitimate’ rebel movements fighting against oppressive regimes from acquiring funds. In this regard, 
the KP is merely conserving the status quo.” 
 111. Winetroub, supra note 73, at 1433. 
 112. James Melik, Diamonds: Does the Kimberley Process Work?, BBC NEWS, June 28, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/10307046.  
 113. Id. Blom stated: “As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, we have supposed human rights abuses 
which I think is out of the gambit of the diamond industry . . . .” Id. (quotes omitted). But cf. 
CAMPBELL, supra note 5, at 241 (“To most people who monitor the trade in conflict diamonds, this 
seemed an open-and-shut case of a KP participant blatantly violating its commitment to the program. 
Human Rights Watch and other NGOs decried the abuse and called on the Kimberley Process to level 
sanctions on Zimbabwean diamonds.”). 
 114. Melik, supra note 113. Although there can never be a cast-iron guarantee about the 
provenance of diamonds, Mr. Blom of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses believes the public 
can rest assured that the Kimberley Process is a robust system that works most of the time. ‘We want 
to give comfort to the consumer that the diamonds they have bought have come from legitimate 
sources and they can wear it with pride and with love,’ he says. Id. 
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Many authors have pointed out flaws with the KPCS, and have 
recommended potential remedies. One of the flaws of the KPCS is that, 
while participation is encouraged by the United Nations, it is entirely 
voluntary. A more forceful push from the United Nations would 
presumably increase KPCS membership, giving it the power to actually 
end global trade in blood diamonds.
115
 Another critique of the KPCS is 
that, because it lacks an independent monitoring system, it becomes too 
easy for participating nations to opt-out of their own laws prohibiting trade 
of blood diamonds.
116
 Some type of uniform enforcement policy would 
ensure participant compliance. In addition to implementing their own 
enforcement schemes, participating countries create their own 
punishments for violations of KPCS requirements and standards.
117
 
Uniform punishments could result in a more effective KPCS.
118
 
 
 
 115. Fishman, supra note 61, at 234. Fishman insists,  
in order for the Scheme to truly be effective, global participation is imperative. However, 
despite unanimous support for the Scheme from all members of the United Nations General 
Assembly, only forty-three nations, with twenty more attempting to meet the criteria for 
membership, currently participate. The commitment of approximately sixty-three nations by 
no means amounts to global participation.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Wetzel, supra note 1, at 174 (“The most important practical problem 
from the outset was seen in the lack of a forceful international dimension of enforcement, i.e., the 
absence of an international monitoring body.”). 
 116. Fishman, supra note 61, at 235. Fishman suggests a partnership with the United Nations as a 
means of establishing this independent monitoring system:  
Creating a task force or commissioning an organization to keep a closer watch on all 
participating nations (that has the power to sanction those which do no not comply with the 
fullest force possible) may serve as a monitoring system that can eradicate some of the 
current problems with compliance.  
Id. See also Wetzel, supra note 1, at 174. Wetzel also points out, 
the KP is a regime in which the industries and states active in the diamond trade voluntarily 
regulate themselves. The Interlaken Declaration of 2002 as its constituting document is not an 
international treaty, but rather, a non-binding political agreement between participating 
nations. In addition, while the establishment of a system of internal controls in general is 
required, specific measures such as the licensing of traders, extended record-keeping and 
spot-checks are only recommended. 
Id. at 175 (footnote omitted). Because each participant creates its own domestic controls to implement 
the Kimberley Process, “the success of the KP depends on the quality of the internal controls in both 
diamond exporting and importing countries.” Id. at 176. 
 117. One possible explanation for the broad discretion left to each participating state is the 
concern that a uniform system might not realistically work in each individual, unique nation. 
Participants face different needs and concerns, which may not be adequately addressed by a uniform 
scheme. Another explanation could be one of empowerment. Countries may be more likely to follow a 
regulatory scheme if they are charged with creating it. 
 118. Fishman, supra note 61, at 236. Currently,  
 a blood diamond trader in one participating nation might receive a penalty as extreme as 
capital punishment, while a blood diamond trader in another participating country could face 
little more than a slap on the wrist. Under the terms of the Scheme as currently drafted, 
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Another critique of the KPCS is the lack of government control over 
diamond mines. Arguably, increased security at mining sites would 
decrease the number of unregistered, unlicensed or illegal miners, 
therefore preventing these diamonds from entering the stream of 
commerce.
119
 However, the efficiency of this structure assumes that those 
monitoring the security efforts at the mines are not working under a 
corrupt regime, and are not corrupt themselves. Security guards like those 
overseeing Zimbabwe’s Marange mining camps only perpetuate the trade 
cycle of blood diamonds rather than prevent diamonds from entering the 
market. 
Another concern with the KPCS is the ease at which a country could 
forge the certificates on which the entire scheme relies.
120
 Many African 
nations have forged documents to procure arms—this history may indicate 
the possibility that the same countries would be willing to falsify a KPCS 
 
 
however, both nations are complying with the requirements for membership and are 
considered participants in good standing.  
Id.  
 119. Id. at 238. Fishman points to Botswana as an example of a country that has used heightened 
security in mines to prevent diamond-smuggling: “Botswana serves as a good example of a nation 
where the government effectively secures all diamond mines by keeping a tight reign over excavation. 
The Botswanian mines are heavily guarded, and at the end of each workday, all excavators are 
thoroughly searched for diamonds.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 120. There is additional concern that since the KPCS regulates only rough diamonds, trade of 
suspicious polished, cut or set diamonds continues to go unregulated. See Wetzel, supra note 1, at 174.  
On a practical level, only rough diamonds are targeted; processed diamonds fall outside the 
scope of the certification scheme. However, by cutting, polishing and setting, diamonds are 
substantially transformed, thereby acquiring new countries of origin. A review by the NGO 
Global Witness found millions of dollars worth [sic] of ‘suspicious’ trading on polished 
diamonds.  
Id. Wetzel’s proposed solution for this issue is “to extend the KP to further parts of the supply chain” 
but this may be difficult to implement. Id. Wetzel points out that 
[u]ncertified diamonds could even be stolen or rebranded during ‘trans-shipment’, i.e., the 
transport of diamonds via third countries, and subsequently reinserted into the regulated trade 
as certified. Identifying diamonds according to their geochemical characteristics is 
theoretically possible, but requires scientific expertise beyond that of ordinary customs 
controls. All of this leads to the result that the true country of origin cannot always be 
determined.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also CAMPBELL, supra note 5, at 240 (discussing the problem of tainted 
diamonds becoming certified and entering the mainstream diamond market). Campbell writes, 
[w]hat’s worse, the Kimberley Process has almost no mechanism for dealing with this 
problem. Site visits to review how participants are following the agreement’s dictates and 
principles are infrequent, and follow-up visits to ensure those falling short are tightening 
screws can take years. Rogue participants can flaunt the system for years with no real worry 
they’ll be sanctioned. There seems little will among Kimberley Process leadership to use its 
only punishment tools, suspension or expulsion from the club. 
Id. 
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certification document if given a strong incentive.
121
 The diagnosis may 
be to offer KPCS participants some kind of incentive to stay committed to 
the Kimberley Process.
122
 
In addition to proposed changes to the KPCS to increase efficiency, 
other groups are beginning to fill the gaps left open by the KPCS’ failure 
to adapt to the realities of the conflict diamond issue. 
One such group is the Responsible Jewellery Council.
123
 This group 
consists not of states, but of more than 400 companies form the mining 
and retail sectors of the diamond industry, and also the gold and diamond 
industries.
124
 The Responsible Jewellery Council’s Code of Practices 
requires members to follow certain practices including those related to 
human rights, working conditions, health and safety, and disclosure 
regarding mining of diamonds and precious metals.
125
 The Code of 
Practices also establishes a relationship with the KPCS.
126
 
Another group seeking to supplement the existing KPCS scheme is the 
Diamond Development Initiative,
127
 which seeks to foster “an 
environment that leads to economic development not just for the state as a 
 
 
 121. Fishman, supra note 61, at 239. “Many African nations, however, have repeatedly provided 
false end-user certificates to disguise their arms shipments to rebels in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the 
DRC. These nations engage in such illegal trade because rebel groups handsomely reward each 
country for participation. Having demonstrated a history of disregard for the law, it is not unlikely that 
these same countries would also falsify KPCS certificates if provided a good enough incentive from 
rebel groups to do so.” 
 122. Fishman, supra note 61, at 234, 238–40. Fishman proposes two potential incentive structures. 
First, she suggests incorporating “into the KPCS a commitment to reduce import limits on each 
diamond producing country’s chief import, in exchange for continued commitment to the KPCS.” Id. 
The United Nations would broker these agreements between participating diamond-exporting 
countries and their major trading partners, even negotiating reduced taxes. Id. Second, “a trade 
agreement mechanism could be incorporated into the KPCS where, if any country violates the KPCS, 
all other participating countries can retaliate against that violator by refusing to import goods from that 
nation.” This would motivate countries to follow KPCS requirements more closely. Id. at 239–40. 
 123. About, RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/about-rjc/ 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2015). The Responsible Jewellery Council describes itself as follows: “The RJC is 
a whole-of-supply chain standards initiative for the jewellery supply chain, from mine to retail. It is 
unique in its participation of organisations at every step of the value chain, each bringing a 
commitment to a responsible supply chain and implementation of responsible business practices.” Id. 
 124. Burton, supra note 24, at 439.  
 125. Code of Practices, RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, Provs. 5–28 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/files/RJC_Code_of_Practices_2013_eng.pdf.  
 126.  Id. at prov. 27. Provision 27.1 prohibits members from knowingly buying or selling conflict 
diamonds, and provision 27.2 requires members to implement the KPCS verification system for trade 
in rough diamonds. Members must also keep records of every Kimberley Process Certificate they 
receive, which the Responsible Jewellery Council will audit annually according to provision 27.4. 
 127. Our Vision, DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, http://www.ddiglobal.org/our-vision/ (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2015).  
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whole, but also for the miners and their communities . . .”
128
 The Diamond 
Development Initiative is an “observer” of the KPCS, so it has partnered 
with the KPCS on certain group committees and initiatives.
129
 The 
Diamond Development Initiative partnered with the Responsible Jewellery 
Council in 2011, each organization becoming a member of the other, to 
help advance the goals of both.
130
 
CONCLUSION 
Criticism and skepticism aside, the Kimberley Process is, at the very 
least, a very good step in the right direction in the global effort to curb the 
trade of blood diamonds. Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe all saw 
brutal civil wars funded by the trade and sale of valuable diamonds. 
Cursed by abundant resources, greed and corruption ran rampant in these 
countries when the powerful exploited the land’s wealth at the expense of 
the powerless.  
It would be over-simplifying the situations in Angola and Sierra Leone 
to say that conflict diamonds no longer have negative impacts on people 
living in those countries. That said, the KPCS appears to be more 
successful in Angola and Sierra Leone than it is in Zimbabwe. I observe 
two major reasons why this is the case. First, Zimbabwe’s legitimate 
government is unwilling to play by the KPCS rules. There is a sense of 
opportunism in Zimbabwe’s use of a very serious loophole in the KPCS 
framework. This is very significantly linked to the second reason why the 
KPCS’ success has been limited in Zimbabwe; namely, the loophole 
created in the KPCS definition of “conflict diamond.” As has been 
discussed, the definition does not account for diamonds that are used by 
legitimate, albeit corrupt, governments that are not technically rebel 
 
 
 128. Burton, supra note 24, at 440. The Diamond Development Initiative “focuses largely on the 
plight of artisanal and alluvial (surface diamonds) miners, attempting to put in place regulations that 
will give laborers a better share of the revenue from their efforts outside of large mining companies.” 
Id. 
 129. Kimberley Process Development Agenda, DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, 
http://www.ddiglobal.org/our-work/kimberley-process-development-agenda (last visited Sept. 6, 
2015). 
 130. Burton, supra note 24, at 440 (“In November 2011, DDI and RJC partnered to advance each 
of their goals. Each organization became a member of the other to ensure greater cooperation to 
achieve improved social, environmental, and labor practices. The joint venture will seek governmental 
and intergovernmental sponsors for its projects, a move that will enable both organizations to better 
ensure ethical mining.”) (footnotes omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/8
  
 
 
 
 
2016] BLOOD DIAMONDS 159 
 
 
 
 
groups.
131
 The human rights abuses occurring in Zimbabwe’s Marange 
diamo 
nd fields occupy this precise niche, and therefore Zimbabwe remains in 
minimum compliance with the KPCS. 
Of the various suggested improvements by critics and skeptics, the 
simplest and most easily-enforced change would be to expand the KPCS 
definition of “conflict diamond” to include the trade of diamonds by 
groups, and even legitimate governments, that commit gross human rights 
violations within the boundaries of the country in which the diamonds are 
mined or the country in which the trading group operates.
132
 This 
redefinition of a “conflict diamond” would be an easy place to start, and 
would specifically address the situation in Zimbabwe, which is arguably 
the KPCS’ biggest failure.
133
  
Audrie Howard

 
 
 
 131. Campbell points to the Zimbabwe situation: 
KP representatives argued that the diamonds from Zimbabwe weren’t conflict diamonds, in 
that rebels weren’t using them to wage war against the government. That the government was 
effectively waging war against its own citizens, and selling the bounty of that war into the 
multibillion-dollar international diamond market as perfectly clean stones approved by the 
Kimberley Process, seemed not to matter. 
Supra note 5, at 241. 
 132. This change in definition would necessarily be incorporated into the legislative schemes 
participants have already developed, reducing the need for uniform measures of enforcement and 
punishment across all participating states. 
 133.  While this change of definition would be the simplest, and I believe easiest way to address 
the shortcomings of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, I believe a fuller, more complicated 
remedy would yield the best results. This remedy would pull from all of the suggestions made by 
authors and commentators who have studied the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme and how it 
has changed the landscape for diamond trade since its implementation. An ideal remedy would include 
a true over-arching governing body for the KPCS, as well as uniform rules, incentives and 
punishments across all participating countries. It would also extend certification requirements beyond 
the export stage to all stages of the diamond production, so that the diamond’s path could be traced 
from country of origin, through the cutting, polishing and setting phases, all the way though the 
diamond’s ultimate purchase and end destination. The redefinition of “conflict” diamond is merely the 
first step in a series of changes that should be implemented to make the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme the effective tool it was created to be. 
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